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Interview on the Republic of Macedonia
with Zhidas Daskalovski
Přemysl Rosůlek ∗
Mr. Zhidas Daskalovski holds a Ph.D. from the Political Science Department, Cen-
tral European University. He has published numerous scholarly articles on politics
in the Southeast European region, as well as co-edited books including: Under-
standing the War in Kosovo (Frank Cass: London, 2003) and Ten Years after the
Ohrid Framework Agreement: Lessons (to be) Learned from the Macedonian Expe-
rience (CRPM and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Skopje 2012). A professor and one of
the most prominent political scientists in the country, Daskalovski is Director of the
Council of Europe supported by the School of Public Policy “Mother Theresa”. Dr.
Daskalovski was the 2008 Young Scientist of the Year of the Macedonian Academy
of Science and one of the Distinguished Persons of Bitola of the University of Kli-
ment Ohridski. He is also the recipient of a number of distinguished research fellow-
ships including the Lord Dahrendorf Fellowship at St. Antony’s College at Oxford
University, the School of Slavonic and East European Studies Macedonian Studies
Fellowship, and the Social Science Research Council / Ethnobarometer Fellowship
at the University of North Carolina. He has written Macedonia country reports for
Freedom House / Nations in Transit, Open Budget Index, Global Integrity Report,
Bertelsmann Transformation Index, UNDP People-Centred Analysis, and UN Hu-
man Development Report. His expertise is prominent in the general field general
policy analysis, while he focuses particularly on decentralization, democratization,
ethnicity, and multicultural issues. Dr. Daskalovski has gained thorough policy-
research experience in his work for the Center for Research and Policy Making,
War Torn Societies Project (WSP), Local Government Initiative, United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) and the European Sta-
bility Initiative. He was the Chief Advisor to Mr. New Democracy’s leader Imer
Selmani in Macedonia’s 2009 presidential and local elections and to the president
of Macedonia’s Green Party (DOM) in the 2013 local elections.
* * *
The Republic of Macedonia is a small country in the Central Balkans which, in
today’s political and economic terms, is on the periphery of Europe. Despite this
fact, the country appears very often in world media coverage – relations between
Macedonians and Albanians, the long lasting name dispute with Greece, the wire-
tapping scandal, or the refugee crisis. Media content often fabricates the image of
the country as a troublesome one. Is the media’s picture actually worse than the
reality of the situation?
What differentiates Macedonia from most European countries is that for some
twenty five years its status as an independent state has been continually challenged
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by Greece; and also Albanian nationalism. Moreover, it has recently become part
of the geopolitical struggle over influence in the Balkan region between Moscow
and Washington D.C. Proximity to the Middle East has also influenced politics due
to the current refugee crisis. Traditionally poor and with few natural resources, it
faces a big challenge in developing a genuine economic model for growth. Of course
the media looks for negative stories, scandals and conflicts, so it does not report
on the good economic performance of Macedonia, the ability to steer away from
the Yugoslav wars of succession, or to minimize and quickly end its own conflict
with the ethnic Albanian guerrillas in 2001.
Relations between the majoritarian ethnic Macedonian population and the Albanian
minority have been one of the country’s most serious problems since the beginning
of its independence. How would you evaluate the implementation of the Framework
Agreement signed in Ohrid in 2001 which helped to end up the conflict between
Macedonian security forces and Albanian armed rebels and promised more rights
to ethnic Albanians living in the country? Are there stil l some important issues
between Macedonians and Albanians that are unresolved?
The so-called Ohrid Framework Agreement envisioned a series of political and con-
stitutional reforms aiming to accommodate the grievances of the Albanian com-
munity, while at the same time preserving the unitary character of the state, thus
addressing the concerns of the Macedonian majority who feared a ‘federalisation’
of the country and its eventual disintegration. These reforms included meeting
many of the demands raised by Macedonian Albanians throughout the 1990s and
introducing features of consociational power sharing, such as a system of dou-
ble majorities requiring consent from minorities (labeled ‘ethnic communities’ by
law) represented in parliament to key decisions of the Parliament (the right of
minority veto). Other reforms dealt with electing members of the Supreme Court,
Judicial Council and the Public Attorney, a substantial degree of municipal de-
centralization, as well as confidence-building measures to overcome the immediate
consequences of the 2001 conflict. The agreement and the constitutional amend-
ments also granted official status to languages spoken by more than twenty per
cent of the population. Furthermore, the agreement promoted the policy of achiev-
ing equitable and just representation in the public administration at the national
and local level as the highest priority, a key reform in the public sector.
Although today Macedonian society is still split along ethnic lines, conflicts
have been subdued with the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.
All Macedonia’s political parties share the view that Macedonia should become
a member of the EU and NATO. There is a strong consensus among political
groups and citizens that a market democracy should be the basis of the coun-
try’s political system. The process of interethnic consolidation following the Ohrid
Framework Agreement is supported by the European Union. Indeed, to ensure that
the government fulfills its obligations from the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the
EU has made the further integration of Macedonia into Europe conditional on full
implementation of the agreement. Promotion of multi-ethnicity, political modera-
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tion and tolerance among ethnic groups are widely understood as being important
characteristics of Macedonian politics.
There are of course challenges and debates, which is normal in multinational
states, and Macedonia is no different than Belgium or Spain. There are new and
different demands posed by ethnic Albanian politicians, consideration of which
has so far been refused by Macedonian political leaders – for example, introducing
a budget which would take into consideration the numerical strengths of the two
communities and divide the spoils accordingly in different sectors such as educa-
tion, health, culture, and so on. There are other contentious questions, but the
point is that after 2001 and OFA, internal conflict has been ruled out.
However, Albanians in Macedonia are not unified in their goals. Their political
elites run several parties and apart from ad hoc achievements, they are not able to
establish a grand coalition, or pre- or post-electoral coalitions. Why?
Ethnic Albanian parties are led by politicians who need to cater to their own
interests and the interests of their constituencies. The “grand questions” were
solved in 2001, and the international community firmly supports the integrity of
Macedonia and its territorial borders, as they are in the Balkans, so there is no
need or time to have a unified front against Macedonian politicians and state.
What about Albanian extremism or separatism? Does it really exist as a serious
security threat?
Albanian extremism or separatism is stronger in Kosovo, where it had (or still
has) institutional support and legacy. The whole 2001 conflict for example was
imported from there; it was not an autochthonous Macedonian affair. There were
many Albanians from Macedonia who fought in the war in Kosovo; there were
even some leaders, or people who founded the KLA, like Ali Ahmeti, who did
not get any spoils. There were guns; the border was porous; there were also some
radicals ready to fight in Macedonia. So, this combination brought the war in 2001.
There were also the smugglers; you cannot rule out their involvement. It’s always
better for them to have an unstable situation, where they can smuggle more guns,
heroin, and women, than in a stable and peaceful situation. Today Ahmeti is part
of the system and would avoid destabilization of Macedonia as this would hurt the
economy and therefore his electoral prospects.
Other minorities live in Macedonia, such as Serbs, Turks, Vlachs, Bosniaks, Roma
people and others. What are the relations between ethnic Macedonians and other
minorities? And did the relations improve or worsen after the Ohrid Framework
Agreement was signed?
Relations between ethnic Macedonians and Orthodox minorities, Serbs or Vlachs
are very good, as there are few cultural differences between these ethnic groups
and Macedonians. Muslim Bosniaks are seen as a bit more distant group, although
relations are also cordial. The Roma however, regardless of whether they are Mus-
lim, Orthodox, or non-believers, are a different category in the eyes of ordinary
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Macedonians. There is a significant level of avoidance of contact with Roma, es-
pecially as they live in specific localities in the cities. Beyond ethnic distance, this
is also a class issue, as most Roma are poor. Middle-class Roma might be better
accepted, although some distance prevails toward them as well. Relations among
communities have only marginally improved after the Ohrid Framework Agreement
was signed, but there is greater awareness that minorities need to take a bigger
role in public administration duties than before.
Probably the most serious crisis since the beginning of independence erupted last
year, known as the “wiretapping scandal”, and it has been a dispute between major
Macedonian opposition leftist and major governmental right-wing political parties,
which are traditionally large enemies. Could you summarize the issue and what
was the major consequence of the wiretapping scandal?
The opposition got hold of secretly taped conversations of government officials.
Whether they were obtained through “acts of patriotism by concerned members
of the secret service” (the version of the opposition) or through “treason and co-
operation with a foreign secret service” (the version of the ruling party), these
audio tapes were played to the public (via internet and even public broadcastings
at a Concert Hall, in front of a party building, and so on) in a series of instances
throughout the winter and the spring. The tapes indicate government wrongdo-
ings, some more, some less convincingly. Some of the content related to political
management techniques and/or party management, especially during campaigns.
While the opposition commented as if the indications heard in the tapes were con-
clusive evidence of criminal activities and that therefore the government should
immediately resign, the ruling party disputed the content, claiming different ille-
gally recorded conversations very deliberately collated together to make audacious
claims which have nothing to do with reality and certainly are not evidence of
criminal wrongdoings. Since some of the tapes included private conversations of
politicians and their spouses or between politicians of different genders, or gossip-
ing between politicians and journalists, the whole release of the tapes had a surreal
soap-opera feeling where one longed for more details about the private life of con-
cerned politicians. Among many in Macedonia, a widespread ‘sense of impunity’
of VMRO-DPMNE and DUI officials exists, amplified by a long-standing absence
of alternation in government. On the other hand, the opposition does not convey
trust among the citizens, who feel that their motives for releasing the tapes are
not exactly to fight for democracy but for power.
Has the wiretapping scandal uncovered the problem of media freedom in Macedo-
nia? According to the World Press Freedom Index of Reporters without Borders,
Macedonia was in position 34 in 2009, but in 2014 sank to 123rd between Mali and
Angola. What has happened? Is the situation so serious
In Macedonia, we have an abundance of information and media both traditional
and new. There are many different media that report from different political, soci-
etal or ethnic points of view. The main problem in the media sphere in Macedonia
is the low quality of the various outlets combined with the unabated political at-
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tempts for control and censorship. How to deal with the first – how to improve the
quality of the media – I do not know, there are no easy fixes, but to deal with the
second we need overall reforms, not only in the media sector. I will speak more
about this in the next answer to the questions.
Despite the ethnic tensions and sharp cleavage between right-wing and left-wing
major Macedonian parties, the citizens usually point out that the most serious
problems of the country are unemployment, corruption and poverty. Besides, in-
ternational organizations often mention the absence of the rule of law. Is this true?
And if so, is there any way out of these problems for future stability and prosperity?
Unemployment, corruption and poverty are typical problems of modern European
states, in some to a greater extent, in some to a lesser one. Corruption scandals and
mismanagement of public funds occur everywhere in Europe, from the benefits of
MPs in Great Britain to Czech, Romanian or Croatian senior politicians. Bulgaria
is another example of problematic elite politics, not to mention Italy, Greece or
even the Slovenian/Finnish “Patria” military case. What I am getting at is that
absence of rule of law in Macedonia is neither an extreme nor isolated case. A way
out of this problem is to carry out complex reform and strengthen a number of in-
stitutions (the Chief Prosecutor, State Audit Office, Anti-Corruption Commission,
the Ombudsman, the Electoral Commission, the Media Supervisory Body and so
on) as well as party democratization and an increased level of citizen participation
in policy making on a local and, why not, national level, through forums, electronic
voting, referenda and the like.
Let us go now to the international environment. The Republic of Macedonia is
stil l abbreviated in international use as F.Y.R.O.M. There has been a long-lasting
dispute between Greece and Macedonia, shortly after Macedonia’s declaration of
independence over the symbols and constitution. Until now, for over two decades,
this has been an unresolved dispute called ‘the name issue’. Negotiations failed
despite many offers and efforts from international mediators, who attempted to
find a compromise. In return, Greece have blocked the country’s accession into
NATO and the EU, which has frustrated Macedonian politicians and citizens. Can
you imagine that any suggestion might be an acceptable solution for both sides?
Greece is obviously the superior party here, being a member of the EU and NATO.
However, the root of the problem is the admittance of Macedonia to the UN under
the provisional reference. So, one solution of the problem would be for Macedonia
to challenge the legality of the imposed UN designation of “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia” at the International Court in The Hague. Once the Court
rules out that this designation was illegally imposed on the Republic of Macedo-
nia, which it was, the country can resort to using its self-designated name within
the UN system. This would turn the tables and put pressure on Greece to offer
a compromise solution (which I will comment on below), which would be more
acceptable to Skopje.
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In this respect, Greece is irritated by the process known in Macedonia over the last
decade as “antiquization”, which started around 2006 in the country. Macedonian
politicians renamed Skopje Airport to Alexander the Great Airport and began to
raise statues of Alexander the Great in Skopje and other cities. A similar policy also
applies to other antique symbols. How important are these symbols for Macedonia?
And are Macedonians aware that it is provoking neighbouring Greece and adding
constraints to any solution on the name issue?
Macedonians believe in the right to self-determination as far as the name issue
is concerned. History and especially ancient history has been used and abused
by Balkan states and nations to the benefits of their state and nation building
agendas for a long time. In fact, Greece, when established in the 19th century, did
not take into consideration the legacy of Alexander the Great, and incorporated
that part of its history only decades later. The fact that Macedonians nowadays
emphasize links with Ancient Macedon cannot be taken as hostile propaganda by
Greece unless Athens insists on preserving the purity of their national myth. If
Greece recognizes Macedonia as such including the existence of a separate (con-
temporary) Macedonian nation and language, the Republic of Macedonia could
easily acknowledge the Greek historical point of view on the ancient Kingdom of
Macedon. This is the best solution for the dispute to be reached amicably, for the
country to be called the Republic of Makedonija internationally (using the original
name, not transcribed into the English form Republic of Macedonia). Thus, Mace-
donia would acknowledge the Greek historical legacy over Ancient Macedon, while
Greece would not object if the ethno-nation is labeled Macedonian. There would
be no need for a referendum in Macedonia as the new name would be according to
the Constitution, while the designation of the language could be with a footnote
that this is a modern form of Macedonian, as the ancient form of the language has
yet to be conclusively analyzed and there is only few available/discovered evidence
of it.
What about relations with Kosovo? Macedonia was rather afraid of this new coun-
try in the western Balkans, and it was also reluctant to recognise Kosovo at the
beginning. In between, the official relations between Skopje and Prishtina improved.
Nevertheless, could Kosovo pose a threat to Macedonia in terms of the export of
terrorism and extremism into Macedonia and could it be supportive of separatist
and irredentist tendencies among Albanians in Macedonia?
The events in Kumanovo this May, when a terrorist unit infiltrated the town and
was neutralized after a bloody intervention by security forces, testifies to the fact
that Kosovo is home to potentially very dangerous splinter groups with capacities
in cooperation with domestic radicals to destabilize Macedonia. While the major-
ity of Albanians in the country do not support terrorism and extremism, there are
some who harbor separatist and irredentist tendencies. It is up to the domestic
politicians and the so-called international community to effectively deal with such
threats, emphasizing over and over and acting resolutely upon the basic premise
that Macedonia is not up for grabs by nationalistic forces and that the stability of
the Western Balkans is best served by preserving the territorial integrity of all the
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neuralgic states, Macedonia, but also Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Geopo-
litical struggles between Washington and Moscow might have a negative effect here
while a quick NATO and EU integration of the region will have a strongly positive
and stabilizing effect.
Relations with Bulgaria were tensed due to the dispute over historical, national and
language identities and also for the official policy of Sofia toward the Macedonian
minority in southwestern Bulgaria. It seems that these issues were – at least on
the official level – resolved. However, Bulgaria joined Greece to block Macedonia
in starting accession talks to the EU at the end of 2012. Bulgaria argued that
Macedonia steals from Bulgaria’s history. What do the Macedonians think about
such an argument? And have relations with Bulgaria improved?
Unfortunately, relations with Bulgaria are improving only very slowly, both in
terms of politics and in terms of business and cultural links. The main culprit
is Bulgaria, which persists in its foreign and domestic policies of the attempted
assimilation of Macedonians into the Bulgarian realm. Recognition of a distinct
Macedonian ethnic group/nation would have helped the relations tremendously,
but such recognition is not forthcoming. Meanwhile, the distance between Mace-
donians and Bulgarians continues to grow, so that if at the beginning of the 20th
century Macedonians looked at Sofia and Bulgaria as more or less as a close rela-
tive, today these relations are reduced to an uneasy friendship with a tendency of
Bulgarians to be seen as unfriendly neighbors in the future.
The dispute between Macedonian and the Serbian Orthodox Church over heritage
remains unresolved since the secession of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. How
relevant is this factor in mutual relations between Macedonia and Serbia?
The relations on a state level are very good. Ordinary citizens also have cor-
dial relations, excluding the attitudes of some ethnic Albanians from Macedo-
nia who express hatred towards Belgrade. The relations between the Churches
do not greatly affect public and private relations between Macedonia and Serbia
also because both nations are not very religious; Orthodoxy is more of a tra-
ditional/historical/cultural issue rather than a purely religious one, and few in
Macedonia and Serbia are practicing believers.
During 2015, the wiretapping scandal was “beaten” by the refugees crisis. Macedo-
nia became one of the most liberal countries in Europe when it enabled refugees to
cross through the country legally and even started to organize transport northwards
to the Serbian border. Nevertheless, how long can Macedonia stand two, three or
even five thousand refugees a day entering the country from Greece and heading
north? And what are the reactions of ordinary Macedonian citizens to the influx of
refugees into the country in terms of xenophobia and islamophobia?
There has been a mix of reactions to the refugee crisis. A part of Macedonian
society is actively and passively engaged in aiding the refugees. Another portion is
very worried about what could happen if the borders up north become closed, if
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Germany, Austria, Hungary, and eventually Serbia decided to close their borders.
Obviously a poor country, which has only recently begun recovering from economic
hardships and reducing unemployment, cannot cope with such a large influx of
refugees. At the moment, very few refugees have claimed asylum in Macedonia,
but if circumstances as described above change we could potentially witness many
refugees trapped on our northern and southern border and in localities nearby. One
cannot predict what would happen, but past experiences of refugees crossing into
Macedonia (from Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Kosovo) give us optimism that
instances of xenophobia and islamophobia would be very limited. The dangers of
illegal smuggling, petty crime and perhaps violence, however, will be real and the
problem might become exorbitant very soon.
Next year, Macedonia will celebrate 25 years of independence. Do you feel there
will be reason to celebrate this event?
Sure, Macedonia has had a turbulent past from ancient times till modernity. The
existence of the independent Republic of Macedonia has been part of the dream and
sustained effort of many generations of ethnic Macedonians following the breakup
of the Ottoman Empire and the incorporation of the territory of Macedonia into
the Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek nation states. Other ethnic groups have slowly
been incorporated into the modern Macedonian state. Following the signing of the
Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001, ethnic tensions and the disputations of the
character of the Macedonian Republic have been significantly reduced. Although
there are still many risks, Macedonia serves as an example among many other
European states on how multiethnic relations can be successfully managed and
conflicts reduced.
